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RECENT DECISIONS

managers. The principle enunciated in this case of first impression
permits shareholders to exercise a greater voice in the management
of their business affairs.

M
FEDERAL PRACTICE-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-SET-OFF AGAINST

ALLOWED.-The Shanghai-Nanking Railway
Administration, an official agency of the Republic of China, established a $200,000 account with the National City Bank of New York
in 1948. Subsequently, the bank refused to permit withdrawal of the
funds. The Republic of China thereupon brought suit in the federal district court wherein the bank raised two counterclaims for
$1,634,432,' which it later denominated as a set-off. Both the district
court and court of appeals refused to allow such a set-off, stating
that it was violative of the doctrine of sovereign immunity since the
set-off did not arise out of the same transaction as the sovereign's
claim. By a divided court, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not preclude the defendant
from raising any set-off. The Court reasoned that by initiating the
action in this country the foreign sovereign impliedly subjected itself
to such set-off or counterclaims. National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 75 Sup. Ct. 423 (1955).
The origin of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not clear.
The prevailing opinion appears to be that it originated early in English history and reached its maturity with the divine right of kings
theory.2 When the United States Constitution was drafted little was
said concerning this immunity principle, and nothing applicable to it
was incorporated therein.8 In 1793 the Supreme Court, in Chisholm
v. Georgia,4 held that a state was subject to a suit brought by a citizen
of another state. Immediately after this decision, the Constitution
was amended so as to preclude such suits.5 No mention, however,
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

I Both counterclaims arose out of treasury notes issued by the Chinese
government which had become due and payable.
2 See Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity,
13 LA. L. REv. 476, 477-480 (1953). See also Barry, The King Can Do No
Wrong, 11 VA. L. REv. 349, 350-355 (1925) ; Borchard, Governmental Responsibility In Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17-37 (1926).
3 It has been suggested that a literal interpretation of Article III would
justify a suit against the Federal Government. See Pugh, supra note 2, at 481.
Blackstone recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity in his writings and
this played an important part in the molding of American thought concerning
this question. Id. at 479, 481.
42 DalU. 419 (U.S. 1793).
5 "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
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was made concerning the Federal Government. Nevertheless, in 1821
Chief Justice Marshall declared by dictum that the Federal Government was immune from suit.6 Later decisions adopted this immunity
rule and it is now firmly embodied in our Iaw.7 It is to be noted,
therefore, that the doctrine of national sovereign immunity had its
genesis in judicial opinion.
Comparable to the Federal Government's immunity, is the immunity that is afforded to friendly foreign sovereigns. Under this
doctrine, a foreign country may not be sued in our courts, unless that
government gives its consent.8 Like the doctrine of national sovereign
immunity this rule arose out of judicial opinion and was based upon
policy considerations. 9 The problem was first encountered in the
0
case of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.1
The Court, travelling on what it termed an "unbeaten path," granted immunity. Chief
Justice Marshall stated that, if the Court held foreign governments
susceptible to process by our courts without their consent, it would
violate our duty to respect the dignity of these foreign sovereigns."
It was believed that this immunity would assure the 12mutual benefit
that is derived from free intercourse between nations.
Both the national and foreign sovereign immunity rules are still
recognized in the law. Neither rule, however, has escaped criticism
from the bench's and bar.' 4 The injustices resulting from the naStates by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. XI.
6 "The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or
prosecuted against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize

such suits."

Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 411-412 (U.S. 1821).

As early as 1850 the Supreme Court stated that "[nJ o maxim is thought
to be better established, or more universally assented to, than that which ordains
that a sovereign, or a government representing the sovereign, cannot ex delicto
be amenable to its own creatures or agents employed under its own authority
for the fulfilment merely of its own legitimate ends." Hill v. United States,
7

9 How. 386, 389 (U.S. 1850).

The Court's reasoning on why such immunity

should be granted has varied over the years. See Pugh, Historical Approach
to the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476, 485 et seq. (1953).
8
Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); see Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938); Kingdom of Roumania
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 Fed. 341, 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663
(1918).
9See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 75 Sup. Ct 423, 426 (1955).
107 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812).
:1 Id. at 136-137. In reflecting on the Exchange case, the court in The
Roseric, 254 Fed. 154, 158 (D.N.J. 1918) stated: "The immunity there accorded was not due to a lack of judicial power. The power was assumed,
but its exercise was waived out of a due regard for the dignity and independence of a sister sovereignty, with whom this nation was at peace."
12 See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, supra note 10 at 136. In such
cases, the Supreme Court takes the view that it is better that such disputes be
settled through diplomatic negotiation. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
13 The court of appeals in the instant case stated that, "[w]e have no high
regard for the idea that, without its consent, a government may not be sued
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tional immunity rule, however, have been greatly diminished over the
course of years by congressional legislation. In order to insure a
just determination, as early as 1797 Congress enacted a law that allows
a party sued by the Government to raise any set-offs that he may
have.r Later enactments have subjected the Government to direct
suits brought by its citizens 0 or those of foreign countries.17
Congress, however, has done nothing to alleviate the hardships
and injustices resulting from the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. Indeed, as applied in the United States, it has been termed
the "absolute" rule. While some text writers refer to this absolute
rule as being a rule of international law, 18 a review of contemporary
European decisions will show that this is not correct. 19 Although
the Exchange case had exerted great influence upon the European
courts, 20 the more recent trend has been to take a more restrictive
view. In these countries, the courts distinguish between contracts
entered into by a foreign sovereign in the performance of its governmental functions, and those of a purely commercial character. If it
is a governmental or public contract then the courts will recognize
the sovereign's immunity, but if it is of a commercial nature then no
immunity will be extended. 21
for acts which, if done by a private person, would be actionable wrongs."
Republic of China v. National City Bank, 208 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
In matters of national sovereign immunity, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has expressed its displeasure at such a doctrine. See Wallace
v. United States, 142 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 712 (1944).
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity and suggested reforms see Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States in 28 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220 (1951). The
doctrine of national immunity has been assailed in various law review articles.
See, e.g., Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REv. 349 (1925);
Pugh, HistoricalApproach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L.
REv. 476 (1953).
Under this statute a de151 STAT. 515 (1797), 28 U.S.C. §2406 (1952).
fendant who is sued by the Government may set up cross claims to the amount
of the Government's claim. Such set-offs may be legal or equitable and need
not arise out of the same transaction. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S.
495, 501-502 (1940) ; United States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 83, 105 (U.S. 1849);
United States v. Wilkins, 6 Wheat. 135, 143-144 (U.S. 1821).
16 In 1855 Congress enacted the Court of Claims Act whereby the Government waived much of its immunity and became susceptible to a suit brought by
a citizen. 10 STAT. 612 (1855), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 et seq. (1952).
In 1946 Congress further extended the Government's liability by passing the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
1728 U.S.C. § 2502 (1952). One qualification to this privilege is that equal
privileges be afforded to citizens of the United States who wish to sue that
foreign country in their courts.
18 See 1 OPPEaEItM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1952).
19 See Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign
States in 28 Bair. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 250 et seq. (1951).
20 See Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 228-229.
21 For a complete listing of various European courts' interpretation of this
rule, see Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 250 et seq. In 1952, the State Depart-
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In the United States, under the absolute rule of immunity, an
individual is precluded from bringing any type of suit against a foreign sovereign, and must seek his recourse exclusively through diplomatic channels. 22 Moreover, an individual sued by a foreign government was not permitted to raise a counterclaim against such
government,23 unless the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction which gave rise to the initial claim. 24 The sum recoverable by
the counterclaim was limited to the amount of the sovereign's claim.2 5
The instant case does not alter the fundamental rule that a
friendly foreign government may not be subjected to a suit brought
by a person in our courts. The Court did, however, make some important inroads upon the absolute rule. Perhaps the most notable is
the abandonment of the "same transaction rule." This view, according to Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is ".

.

. too indeterminate, indeed too

capricious, to mark the bounds of the limitations on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity." 26 Petitioners in the present case sought only
to counterclaim for the amount of the Republic of China's claim
against them, and a fair reading of the Court's opinion indicates that
it should be so restricted. In addition, unlike the European courts,
the Supreme Court expressly refused to distinguish, in this instance,
27
between contracts of a public character and those of a private nature.
In effect, therefore, the Supreme Court has brought the rule of
foreign immunity in line with the rule concerning national sovereign
immunity laid down by the Act of 1797. Thus, an individual may,
in an action brought by a foreign sovereign, interpose a counterclaim
as a set-off in mitigation of any recovery by such sovereign regardless
of how the transaction arose. In this respect the Court was unquestionably correct. There is little justice in allowing one person to
raise a counterclaim against a foreign sovereign because it arose out
of the same transaction, and, at the same time, preclude another
ment expressed its approval of this view in a letter to the Attorney General
which reviewed both the absolute rule and the European restrictive concept
It was therein stated that because of the widespread practice of foreign governments to engage in commercial activities in the United States, the restrictive view should be adopted to protect our citizens in their dealings with these
countries. See 26 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 984 (1952).
22See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
23 French Republic v. Inland Nay. Co., 263 Fed. 410 (E.D. Mo. 1920) ; see
In re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 293 Fed. 192, 193-194 (9th Cir.
1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 582 (1924).
24 In reality this is not a true counterclaim, but merely the common-law defense of recoupment. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160 (5th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 676 (1942). Such a claim has always been
permitted against the United States regardless of consent. See United States
v. Wessel, Duval & Co., 115 F. Supp. 678, 687 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
25 Because it is in the nature of a defense, any allowance is limited to the
amount awarded to the sovereign. See United States v. Wessel, Duval & Co.,
supra note 24.
26 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 75 Sup. Ct. 423, 429 (1955).
27 Ibid.
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merely because his action arose separately. In the latter instance, the
individual is compelled to pay his judgment and rely upon the uncertainties and delays of diplomatic negotiations to afford him relief.
As was stated initially, the rule of foreign immunity evolved entirely from judicial opinion, and therefore may be altered as the Supreme Court deems it necessary. The question remains, however,
whether it is proper for the Court to exercise this power. Much of
Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning is valid today and care should be
taken so as not to injure friendly relations with foreign governments.
It is not intended to imply, however, that the rule should remain
unaltered. What was deemed good 134 years ago might well be
detrimental today. Rather, it is submitted that the legislative and
executive branches of the Government, being in a better position to
evaluate the effect of such changes, should re-appraise the entire concept of foreign sovereign immunity. This method would give foreign
governments notice of any change in policy. The instant case might
well prove to be the impetus needed to stimulate such re-appraisal
of the rule.

SALEs - BREACH OF WARRANTY - SUPPLYING OF BLOOD BY
HOSPITAL NOT A SALE.-The plaintiff, a patient at defendant hospital,

was given a blood transfusion by a physician. The blood, supplied to
the plaintiff by the hospital for $60, contained jaundice viruses and,
as a result, the plaintiff developed homologous serum hepatitis. An
action was commenced for breach of implied warranty.1 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency, but the Special
Term denied the motion and the Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed. The Court of Appeals, in reversing,2 held that the supplying
of blood for a price by a hospital is not a sale but merely an incident
of an entire contract for services to which implied warranties do not
attach. Perlmutterv. Beth David Hospital,308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d
792 (1954).
In order for there to be an implied warranty under Section 96
of the Sales Act, there must be a contract of sale.3 However, when

I "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment . .

.

. there is an implied

warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose." N.Y. PENs.
PROP. LAW § 96(1). "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller
who deals in goods of that description .... there is an implied warranty that

the goods shall be of merchantable quality." Id. § 96 (2).

2In a four-three decision, Conway, Dye and Froessel, J.J., dissented.
3 Haag v. Klee, 162 Misc. 250, 293 N.Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1936); see

WHITNEY, LAW OF SALES § 145 (4th ed. 1947).

